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ABSTRACT 
It is estimated that between $600 and $850 billion annually is lost to fraud, waste, and abuse in the US healthcare system, 
with $125 to $175 billion of this due to fraudulent activity (Kelley 2009). Medicaid, a state-run, federally-matched 
government program which accounts for roughly one-quarter of all healthcare expenses in the US, has been particularly 
susceptible targets for fraud in recent years. With escalating overall healthcare costs, payers, especially government-run 
programs, must seek savings throughout the system to maintain reasonable quality of care standards.  As such, the need for 
effective fraud detection and prevention is critical. Electronic fraud detection systems are widely used in the insurance, 
telecommunications, and financial sectors. What lessons can be learned from these efforts and applied to improve fraud 
detection in the Medicaid health care program? In this paper, we conduct a systematic literature study to analyze the 
applicability of existing electronic fraud detection techniques in similar industries to the US Medicaid program. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Healthcare fraud in the United States is a severe problem that costs the government billions of dollars each year. Roughly 
one-third of all US healthcare costs are attributable to fraud, waste, and abuse (Kelley 2009). Third-party payers for 
healthcare services (insurance companies and government-run programs) must deal with fraudulent practitioners, organized 
criminal schemes, and honest providers who make unintended mistakes while billing for their legitimate services. The US 
Medicaid system is particularly susceptible fraud and abuse, as it is harder to exclude problematic providers and is managed 
separately and with limited coordination across the states.  Each state has sovereignty over its program and maintains its own 
eligibility and benefits criterion. This makes nation-wide fraud detection and prevention initiatives more complicated. 
Despite the complexity and structural challenges, strides can clearly be made through technology to improve fraud and abuse 
detection and prevention across the Medicaid program.  What lessons can be learned from the electronic fraud detection 
techniques utilized in similar industries? In the insurance, telecommunications, and financial sectors―particularly the credit 
card industry―fraud detection is vital to sustainability and competitiveness. In general, insurance fraud and abuse are hard to 
discover because of asymmetric information between the insurer, beneficiary, and provider (Derrig 2002). In the Medicaid 
program fraud detection is the responsibility of the state and federal government, who each share the cost of the program. 
Thus, it is their responsibility to reduce the opportunities to commit fraud, improve the detection mechanisms inherent to the 
system, and impose criminal penalties that serve as a deterrent to fraudulent billing from providers and criminal enterprises. 
The structure and the claims process of Medicaid are outlined in section 2. Section 3 presents a systematic literature study of 
the existing electronic fraud detection techniques applied in related industries. Section 4 discusses fraud schemes discovered 
in the past. In section 5, we discuss lessons learned from related industries and the advantages, disadvantages, and constraints 
of the analyzed fraud detection techniques as applied to the Medicaid program. 
MEDICAID 
Medicaid and Medicare are two government programs that provide medical and health-related services to specific groups of 
people in the United States. Although the two programs are very different, they are both funded and overseen, in part or 
whole, by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS), a division of the U.S. Department of Health and Human 
Services. Medicare is a federal program which has consistent rules across the fifty states and covers almost everyone 65 years 
of age or older. Medicaid is a state administered program in which each state provides a unique health care program for 
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individuals and families with low incomes and resources (CMS 2011). Each state sets its own guidelines regarding eligibility 
and services. With passage of the Affordable Care Act of 2010 (ACA), Medicaid eligibility extended from people with 
income up to 100% of the federal poverty line (FPL) to people up to 133% of the FPL, adding tens of millions of newly 
eligible individual.  Medicaid also covers special categories of people, such as pregnant women and children (CMS 2011). In 
2009, 63 million people were enrolled in Medicaid and the overall costs were $381 billion (Truffer et al. 2010). Due to the 
federally-expanded enrollment eligibility criteria enacted by ACA, Medicaid’s expected costs rise to $587 billion by 2015, 
with 68.5 million enrolled (US Congressional Budget Office 2010).  
The United States faces a current and serious fraud problem concerning the social health care (Sparrow 2000).  The current 
standard detection and control systems are not designed to meet the threats of various criminal fraud types (Hyman 2001). 
Electronic “edits” and “audits” are built into highly automated claims processing systems which have all been designed with 
honest providers in mind.  They are designed to catch errors and efficiently reimburse honest providers – verifying eligibility, 
making sure procedure codes match diagnosis, and checking that the price charged is in within bounds – not explore patterns 
that could flag fraudulent or abusive behaviors (Sparrow 2000).  This gives providers and other people with fraudulent 
intentions the opportunity to easily get away with fraudulent behavior by submitting claims that simply look like they were 
for appropriate services (Sparrow 2000). 
Claims Process 
When a provider participates in Medicaid, the provider agrees to the reimbursement rates set by the state and submits claims 
for payment directly to the state’s Medicaid agency. If the provider is not participating in Medicaid, the provider sends the 
patient the bill which he or she has to pay before requesting reimbursement for partial payment from Medicaid. In both 
scenarios, the state Medicaid agency processes the claim and sends an explanation of benefits (EOB) to the beneficiary. An 
EOB is an automatically generated overview of the provided services and corresponding codes and costs.  
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An explanatory 
note is sent to 
the provider
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(State Level)
Medicaid fraud 
control unit
Automated 
Edits
No follow up
Send Explanation
of Medical Benefits
Send Bill
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the Medicaid
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Accept Reject
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Figure 1: Provider Claim Submission to Medicaid 
Every state is responsible for organizing, governing, and operating their Medicaid program. The states process claims with 
the support of software which is differs state to state.  The software performs several prepayment checks and edits to verify if 
the claim is legitimate. Sparrow (2000) provides some examples of the automated audits:  
• Have the mandatory fields been filled in?  
• Do the procedure codes match the diagnosis?  
• Is the pricing in range with the set boundaries for the service or procedure? 
• Has the claim been submitted and paid already (duplicate claims)? 
The edits and audits are designed to verify the information with honest providers in mind. However, the system simply lacks 
effective fraud detection mechanisms (Sparrow 2000). The systems do not verify that the service was provided as claimed, if 
the diagnosis is correct, or if the patient is aware of the claimed services, as they simply do not possess appropriate, verifiable 
information. In addition, when a claim is rejected, there is no follow-up investigation as to why an invalid claim was 
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submitted (Sparrow 2000). Instead of vetting these claims, the system sends an explanation to the provider with the reason 
why the claim was rejected. Thus, instead of flagging what could be fraudulent activity, the system teaches potential 
fraudsters about the system’s billing rules and edits. 
EOBs, while well-intentioned, in their current form provide minimal protection against fraud (Sparrow 2000).  The 
beneficiary has little to no financial incentive to pay attention to them.  Recipients do not understand the complex computer-
generated forms and billing codes contained on them.  And, fraudulent providers have even provided incentives to 
beneficiaries not to read them, including paying $5 per unopened envelope given back to the provider. In addition, many 
fraud schemes deliberately target vulnerable populations that would be unable to open or understand the EOB or are given 
kick-backs from the provider not to complain (Kelley 2009).  
METHODOLOGY 
The foundation of this research is a systematic literature review. In order to systematically review appropriate scientific 
journals, the following databases have been reviewed, with an initial focus on the top 25 information systems journals 
(Schwartz and Russo, 2004): Web of Science, Scopus, PiCarta, and Google Scholar. Figure 2 shows the systematic literature 
review process, with a top down search driven by the keywords, as well as the bottom up search approach using forward and 
backward citation analysis. Using this methodology, relevant disciplines such as finance, telecommunications, health care, 
and computer intrusion detection (see table 4) have been included in the review. Exclusion criteria were articles older than 15 
years and papers which focus on algorithmic data mining without an emphasis on or application to fraud detection. 
Studies from primary search that were available 
and accessible and met the selection criteria 
reading the abstract
n = 116
Studies retrieved from extended 
search (references/citations)
n = 77
Keywords: 
Electronic Fraud Detection
Health Care Fraud
Fraud Detection
Data Mining
Supervised Data Mining
Unsupervised Data Mining
Credit Card Fraud
Insurance Fraud
Statistical Fraud Detection
Fraud and IT
Anomaly Detection
Studies from the extended 
search that met the selection 
criteria, based upon the abstract
n = 56
Studies selected that are relevant for my thesis 
after studying the article
n = 172
Studies included for final review based on the 
selection criteria based upon the abstracts
n = 101
+
Potential relevant studies indentified with a focus 
on the top 25 IS Journals, using the stated 
keywords
n = 151
-
n = 35
-
n = 71
-
n = 21
 
Figure 2: Systematic literature review 
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HEALTHCARE FRAUD TYPES 
Definition of Fraud and Abuse 
The terms fraud, waste, and abuse, as used in literature, encompass a wide spectrum of conduct, ranging from intentional 
misrepresentation of services provided to inadequate documentation of provided care (Hyman 2001). Waste, unnecessary 
services provided and billed for by a provider, have been explicitly excluded from this research, as they are more difficult to 
prove, are many times associated with simple inefficiencies and incompatibilities in the healthcare system, and can call into 
question the subjective medical opinion of providers which can hard to substantiate. While waste is a large problem, it is less 
tractable and comparable to other industries than fraud and abuse. In our review, we will adopt the CMS definitions for fraud 
and abuse (CMS 2011): 
Fraud: Purposely billing for services that were never given or billing for a service that has a higher reimbursement 
than the service produced  
Abuse: Payment for items or services billed by mistake by providers, but should not be paid for by Medicaid 
Fraud Strategies 
Sparrow (2000) describes two polar extremes in a fraud strategy spectrum: the “hit-and-run” and the “steal a little, all the 
time” schemes. The hit-and-run is a short term strategy to bill for and acquire large amounts of money quickly and disappear 
before anyone realizes what happens. At the opposite extreme lies the criminal who steals a little all the time. Legitimate 
health care providers who provide genuine services use their bulk of legitimate claims to hide the incremental stealing.  
Medicaid Telecommunications Credit Card 
Hit and run Subscription fraud Application fraud 
Steal a little all the time  Superimposed fraud  Behavioral fraud 
Table 1: Types of fraud throughout the fraud detection industries 
Similarities exist in the telecommunications industry with subscription fraud (false identification and no intention to pay) and 
superimposed fraud (slow and hidden) (Cahill et al. 2002). Parallels in the credit card industry include application fraud and 
behavioral fraud (Bolton et al. 2002b) (see table 1). A major difference between the aforementioned “hit and run” and “steal a 
little all the time” schemes is the degree to which they are self-revealing (Sparrow 2000).  The “hit and run” parallels in the 
telecommunications and credit card industry are self-revealing because customers, not insurance companies or governments, 
are losing money rapidly and both see and pay the bill.  The “steal a little all the time” comparators are likely more 
applicable, as customers may well not notice small changes in their bills.  Table 2 highlights and categorizes some known 
Medicaid fraud schemes (GAO 2000). 
Fraud Scheme Short Explanation  Type 
Identity Theft Stealing identification information from providers or beneficiaries and using 
that information to submit fraudulent bills to Medicaid. 
Fraud 
Fictitious 
Practitioners 
Enrolling and submitting bills to Medicaid on behalf of fictitious practitioners Fraud 
Phantom Billing Submitting claims for services not provided. Fraud 
Duplicate Billing Submitting similar claims more than once. Fraud/ Abuse 
Bill Padding Submitting claims for unneeded ancillary services to Medicaid. Fraud/ Abuse 
Upcoding Billing for a service with a higher reimbursement rate than the service provided. Fraud/ Abuse 
Unbundling  Submitting several claims for various services that should only be billed as one 
master claim that includes ancillary services. 
Fraud/ Abuse 
Table 2: Medicaid Fraud Schemes (partially derived from (GAO 2000)) 
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FRAUD DETECTION SYSTEMS IN OTHER INDUSTRIES: RESULTS OF THE LITERATURE REVIEW 
Table 4 shows a typology of fraud detection techniques that were discovered in the literature review. In Table 3 this typology 
is used to classify the papers. 
Fraud 
Detection 
Type 
Method Explanation  
A Supervised Classification 
Techniques 
Use training sets with prior information on class membership to learn 
classification patterns 
A1 Linear Discrimination Regression based on a logistic curve 
A2 Support Vector Machines A kernel method which selects small number of critical boundary instances 
(support vectors) to construct a separating hyperplane (Sudjianto et al. 2010) 
A3 Neural Networks A set of interconnected nodes that imitate the functioning of a brain (Kou et al. 
2005) 
A4 Decision Tree Learning Methods for building a decision tree for classification  
B Unsupervised Data 
Mining Techniques 
Do not assume prior class labels of legitimate or fraudulent behavior 
B1 Anomaly Detection Tries to detect outliers that are inconsistent with the remainder of that data set 
(Grubbs 1969). (Barnett et al. 1994)  
B2 Cluster Analysis Divide objects into groups (clusters), with objects in a group being similar to one 
another but dissimilar to the objects in other groups (Ngai et al. 2011). 
B3 Peer Group Analysis Clusters of similar observations (peer groups) are identified and clustered, 
subsequently the individual behavior is compared to the cluster’s behavior (Bolton 
et al. 2001).  
C Statistical Methods Statistical methods are more model and theory based than Data Mining methods 
C1 Visualization Allowing users to view the complex patterns or relationships uncovered in the 
data mining process (Turban et al. 2007)  
C2 Profiling Process of modeling the characteristic aspects of the user (Fawcett et al. 1997). 
C3 Benford’s Law The distribution of the first-digit number of a lot of natural phenomena like size of 
companies, telephone lengths, and invoice amounts will have a characteristic non-
uniform distribution. (Hill 1995; Nigrini 1999)  
D Rule Based Model based on the experience of experts (Bolton et al. 2002b)  
D1 Online Analytical 
Processing (OLAP) 
Dynamic ad-hoc multidimensional analysis (Codd et al. 1993)  
D2 SQL Queries Queries designed by domain experts 
Table 3: Overview Fraud Detection Techniques 
The structured literature review about fraud detection systems in several industries resulted in an overview of applied fraud 
detection techniques (see Table 4). 
 
 
Title Paper Industry Objective paper Type of Fraud Technique Results/Findings/Prob
lems 
Statistical Methods for 
fighting Financial 
Crimes (Sudjianto et al. 
2010) 
Financial To provide a survey of 
statistical techniques 
and data mining. 
Money 
Laundering, 
Retail banking 
fraud 
A 
B1  
B2 
C2 
To provide an overview 
of financial fraud. 
Fraud detection in the 
telecommunications: 
History and Lessons 
learned (Becker et al. 
2010) 
Telecom To discuss major fraud 
schemes and fraud 
detection techniques 
used to address them. 
Subscription and 
Superimposed 
fraud (both 
telecom) 
C1 
C2 
D 
Use simple 
understandable models, 
heavy use of 
visualization, 
involvement of humans. 
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Title Paper Industry Objective paper Type of Fraud Technique Results/Findings/Prob
lems 
Holistic Approach to 
Fraud Management in 
Health Insurance 
(Furlan et al. 2008) 
Health care Holistic overview of 
fraud management: 
fraud detection is just 
one step in the process 
of fraud management 
Health care fraud A 
B 
C 
 
Fraud management is 
just as important as 
fraud detection. A case 
study supports their 
prepositions 
A Comprehensive 
Survey of Data Mining-
based Fraud Detection 
Research (Phua et al. 
2005) 
General  To define existing 
challenges in the fraud 
detection domain for 
diff types of large data 
sets.  
Insurance fraud,  
Credit card 
fraud, 
Tele- 
communications 
A 
B2 
B3 
C2 
Overview of 
Supervised, semi-
supervised and 
unsupervised 
techniques. 
Novel Techniques for 
Fraud Detection in 
mobile  
telecommunications   
Networks (Moreau et al. 
1997) 
Telecom To explore the 
detection of fraudulent 
behavior based upon a 
combination of 
absolute and 
differential behavior. 
Telecom fraud A 
C2 
D 
 
 Obtaining a significant 
amount of fraudulent 
data and labeling it as 
such is a significant 
effort and often a 
problem. 
EFD: A Hybrid 
Knowledge/Statistical 
based System for the 
Detection of Fraud 
(Major et al. 1992) 
Health care 
insurance 
Electronic fraud 
detection. 
Medical 
insurance fraud 
C  
D 
 
With the applied set of 
heuristics true positive 
rates are approximately 
50%. 
A Taxonomy of Frauds 
and Fraud Detection 
Techniques  (Laleh et al. 
2009) 
 
General Provide a taxonomy of 
(new) frauds and fraud 
detection techniques. 
Internal, 
customs, 
insurance, credit 
card, computer, 
tele-
communication 
High level 
overview of 
A & B 
The result is an 
overview of several 
types of fraud and 
different fraud detection 
techniques on a high 
level. High-level 
overview of 
(un)supervised and 
semi-supervised 
techniques. 
Survey of Fraud 
Detection Techniques  
(Kou et al. 2005) 
Credit card 
Computer 
Intrusion 
Telecom 
To provide a 
comprehensive review 
of different fraud 
detection techniques. 
Credit card 
Computer 
intrusion  
Tele-
communications 
A3 
B1 
C1 
D 
Neural network is an 
important tool however 
difficult to implement 
due to a lack of data. 
Profiling to detect fraud 
from call pattern is 
effective. 
Adaptive Fraud 
detection (Fawcett et al. 
1997)  
Telecom To describe a design 
of user profiling 
methods. 
Superimposed 
fraud (Telecom) 
C2 
D 
Fraud detection systems 
must be adaptive and 
people must determine 
(trial-and-error) how to 
profile and which rules 
are effective. 
Unsupervised Profiling 
Methods for fraud 
detection (Bolton et al. 
2002a) 
 
Credit Card  To apply unsupervised 
techniques because 
labeled data is not 
always available. 
Credit card 
transaction fraud 
B3 
C2 
Both analysis and 
visualization have the 
ability to detect 
anomalies and detect 
changes in spending 
trends. 
Statistical Fraud 
Detection: A Review 
(Bolton et al. 2002b) 
Financial 
Computer 
intrusion 
To describe the 
statistical tools 
available in the 
Credit Card 
Money 
laundering 
A 
B1 
C1 
The speed of detection 
is important so the time 
of detection should be 
Travaille et al.  Electronic Fraud Detection in Medicaid 
 
Proceedings of the Seventeenth Americas Conference on Information Systems, Detroit, Michigan August 4th-7th 2011 7 
Title Paper Industry Objective paper Type of Fraud Technique Results/Findings/Prob
lems 
 Telecom different areas. Computer 
intrusion 
Telecom 
C2 
D 
 
measured. How 
effective a statistical 
tool is depends on the 
type of problem. 
Neural Fraud Detection 
in Credit Card 
Operations (Dorronsoro 
et al. 1997) 
Credit card To present an applied 
on-line fraud detection 
system (Minerva). 
Credit card 
transactions 
fraud 
A3  Positive result; it 
detects 40% of all the 
fraudulent transactions 
and, can be used as a 
basis for other models. 
Establishing Fraud 
Detection Patterns 
Based on Signatures 
(Ferreira et al. 2006) 
 
Telecom To detect deviate 
behaviors within a 
useful time span 
Superimposed 
Fraud (Telecom) 
B1 
C2 
The anomaly detection 
with the signature as a 
basis supports the 
detection of telecom 
fraud. 
Data mining for credit 
card fraud: a 
comparative study 
(Bhattacharyya et al. 
2011)  
Credit card To evaluation Random 
Forests and Support 
Vector Machines. 
Credit card fraud A2 
A4  
 
Random forests based 
methods are able to 
obtain good (the best of 
the 3) overall 
performances. 
The application of data 
mining techniques in 
financial fraud detection 
(Ngai et al. 2011) 
Financial To review data mining 
techniques in order to 
discover financial 
fraud. 
Financial and 
insurance fraud 
A 
B1 
B2 
C1 
A review of 49 articles 
to categorize financial 
fraud and an overview 
of applicable data 
mining techniques. 
Table 4: Overview relevant fraud detection papers 
Some papers discuss fraud detection in the health care industry. Major and Riedinger (1992) addressed this topic 19 years 
ago, and, more recently, Furlan and Bajec (2008) touched this topic from a holistic point of view, highlighting the importance 
of fraud detection as well as the broader scope of fraud management. 
LESSONS LEARNED FOR MEDICAID 
The foundations of fraud detection across the various industries studied are underpinned by electronic fraud detection 
mechanisms which flag suspicious transactions for further review. These sophisticated systems must evaluate mass amounts 
of information and match patterns both simple and complex. Systems must be paired with humans knowledgeable of 
appropriate and inappropriate practices to interpret what the data means and to judge if a transaction should be flagged as 
fraudulent (Hand 2010). While Medicaid possesses its own structural complexities, a great deal of progress can be made with 
the help of electronic and human data-driven fraud detection techniques. 
Stakeholder feedback, or the lack thereof, makes automated electronic mechanisms even more important in government 
healthcare fraud control. Ideally, stakeholders should be incentivized, willing, and able to offer information that would 
indicate fraudulent behaviors.  In the credit card and telecommunications industries, customers immediately report fraud, as it 
is in their personal financial best interests to do so.  With health insurance, even if a beneficiary notices a mistake on an EOB, 
they are inclined to think that someone else is paying, so why worry about it (Sparrow 2000).  Thus, little feedback is 
provided from beneficiaries on the legitimacy of claims to state Medicaid agencies.  
The credit card and telecommunications industries possess real time data, resolve reported cases of fraud quickly, and, as 
such, are able to maintain high-quality databases of labeled data which can be used for supervised learning. Medicaid data is 
dispersed and unlabeled, and there are no signals that this will change in the near future. Multiple stakeholders at the federal 
and local level, misaligned incentives, and fragmented responsibility hamper the process of labeling and sharing data. Thus, 
supervised learning techniques are severely restricted. 
Clearly improvement is needed in the feedback loop of prosecutions and post-payment adjustment to label the source claims 
data with high-certainty adjudications that could be leveraged for supervised learning.  This should be a joint effort of the 
federal government, states, and the commercial health insurance industry to improve the data supply and enable the co-
development and sharing of fraud models that could apply across the health care industry.   
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It should be noted that the insurance industry as a whole has much tighter controls around the providers of services, be they 
healthcare practitioners, auto body shops, or home construction contractors. Providers are modeled and compared, and 
providers with costs above an acceptable range are excluded from participation and reimbursement under the insurance 
policy. In contrast, all providers are welcome to participate in Medicaid programs and can only be excluded based on 
fraudulent activities. 
Applicability of Fraud Detection Techniques in Medicaid 
Supervised classification models are particularly appropriate for use in health care fraud, as they can be trained and adjusted 
to detect sophisticated and evolving fraud schemes. In the credit card industry, supervised classification techniques like 
neural networks, support vector machines, and random forests form the basis for sophisticated and effective fraud detection.  
The drawback to these techniques is that new fraud schemes are not immediately detectable due to the lag of discovering and 
labeling new fraud in training data.  In the telecommunications industry, unsupervised techniques such as profiling and 
anomaly detection are applied to complement supervised learning.  In the telecommunications industry, extensive, high-
quality data is available that is used to construct accurate profiles.  Computer security and intrusion detection utilize 
supervised techniques to discover and detect known patterns and anomaly detection to detect new, unique intrusions.  
Unfortunately, with health care’s more diverse set of outcomes and patterns, applying unsupervised techniques suffers from a 
high false-alarm rate, because outliers not necessarily implying fraudulent or abusive behaviors but rather the diversity of 
patterns of care and practitioner prerogatives.   
All of these industries have an important advantage over Medicaid: they all possess accurate, real-time, and largely labeled 
data. Furthermore, these industries are supported by stakeholders who report unusual events and behavior because it affects 
them directly. These commercial industries and their customers do not want to lose profit, and, therefore, they are willing to 
allocate the necessary resources to ensure fraud is removed from the system. These industries and companies realize that 
fraud detection is a vital aspect of doing and staying in business. Medicaid’s prioritization of timely payments over accurate, 
fraud-free payments put the program at a disadvantage from the start. Additionally, the number of stakeholders involved and 
the fragmented responsibilities further complicate fraud control. That said, with today’s technologies and the cooperation of 
those with knowledge of ground-truths, much progress can be made in fighting Medicaid fraud using both supervised and 
unsupervised techniques guided by subject-matter and data experts.  
Modern modeling, scoring, and business intelligence tools can be used to apply some of these techniques.  For example, 
practical anomaly detection and peer group analysis can be performed and automated when combining claims history with 
geographically and socioeconomically adjusted provider models. Using dashboards and visualization tools, problematic 
providers quickly stand out and raise flags for targeting. Business intelligence tools can serve as an important monitoring 
instrument for payment trends by various dimensions that could be signaling fraud. For example, if, for a specific geographic 
area, the Medicaid payment profile across provider types suddenly diverges from historical norms and recent national trends, 
a localized criminal enterprise may be at play. Clearly developing these models with appropriate environmental variables is a 
challenge, but today’s business intelligence, modeling, and scoring tools make their real-world application practical and 
achievable.  
CONCLUSION 
Given the fact that the Medicaid is the payer of last resort and receives little feedback from the actual beneficiary of paid 
healthcare services, the dependence on electronic fraud detection is significantly greater than in similar studied industries. As 
learned from the credit card industry, telecommunications, and computer security, fraud detection using supervised 
classification can be extremely effective. However, the base requirement for this approach (labeled data) is currently not 
available across the Medicaid program. The clear benefits of supervised learning techniques should be weighed against the 
costs of streamlining data acquisition and closing the feedback loop from adjudicated claims to labeled claims data. Given the 
high rate of fraud estimates across Medicaid and the program’s overall expenditures, it is unfathomable that these IT and 
business process problems could not be overcome for orders of magnitude less investment than the dollars lost to fraudulent 
behavior in the program.  
In section 3, the analysis showed that supervised techniques are necessary for an effective fraud detection system. 
Furthermore, the extensive application of classification techniques in various domains proves the effectiveness and utility to 
contribute to fraud detection. However, no one technique, supervised or unsupervised, is applicable to discover all fraud 
strategies and schemes. A fraud detection system consisting of multiple techniques, with a flexible, modular approach 
capable of adapting to the continuous changes in the fraud detection field, must be employed to effectively combat fraud and 
abuse.  
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Over time and with increasing levels of sophistication in the fraud control systems, empirical testing must be performed to 
evaluate their efficacy. Evaluation criteria should include the detection rate, effort, interpretability, and return on investment.  
The corresponding costs of developing a fraud detection system should be offset and weighed against the resulting benefits of 
the fraud detection system. What are the strengths and weaknesses of the system, and how can its performance be enhanced? 
Applying data collection and fraud detection techniques in practice through a state-centric pilot program would help 
determine the effectiveness of various approaches. 
A major limitation of this study is its theoretical approach; a systematic literature study has been conducted to provide an 
overview of the current worrisome situation in Medicaid and what electronic fraud detection techniques exist in related fraud 
detection domains. The published fraud frameworks are limited since fraudsters would benefit from being able to easily 
access the information and would undoubtedly attempt to use that sensitive information to enhance their fraud techniques. 
While not an ideal investigation, the literature review does provide a proper first impression and overview of the existing 
fraud schemes and detection techniques as currently applied across similar industries. 
Future research should be undertaken to evaluate the current methodologies and tools employed by states and CMS to detect 
and prevent fraud as well as to assess the potential impact of the methodologies discussed in this paper.  In addition, while 
not a technology problem, an in-depth assessment should evaluate the effects of Medicaid policy changes such as increasing 
Medicaid provider enrollment standards, delaying payment to allow for more claim review time, or providing incentives to 
report fraudulent activity found on EOBs.   
The high number of stakeholders, 50 states with unique legislation and eligibility rules, and the sheer magnitude of the 
program complicate Medicaid fraud control efforts. As Sparrow (2000) explains, fraud should be properly measured to create 
a realistic impression of the current situation and an estimation of the amount of fraud and abuse in the system. The 
Thompson Reuters estimation (Kelley 2009) of $600 to $850 billion lost to fraud, waste, and abuse annually is only an 
estimate.  Without significant, periodic audits of randomly sampled claims across the Medicaid system, it is impossible to 
accurately estimate the level of fraud, waste, and abuse in the system and its change over time.  Although fraud will never be 
completely eradicated, it can be better managed with systematic improvements in data collection, applied detection and 
prevention tools, better incentive structures, and enforcement actions. 
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